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OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT
LETTER FROM SOUTH AMERICA
Geoffrey Wawro
Although the United States must think and deploy
strategically in every hemisphere, it is here in its
own that it confronts some of the greatest chal-
lenges to American peace and prosperity. Richly
provided with energy, farmlands, potable water,
and other natural resources, Latin Americans have
nevertheless stumbled from one failed regime to
another, often looking to fulfill the words of the real
author of the Monroe Doctrine, John Quincy Ad-
ams, who saw in 1823 a continent “stamped with
arbitrary power and civil dissension,” far more
likely to become “a domicile of despotism” than “a house of freedom.”
With no history of political unity, the South American continent has long
been divided into marginal states of doubtful self-sufficiency. This insuffi-
ciency—legal, economic, administrative, political, military—has today created
the optimal conditions for organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism.
With 220 million Latin Americans, 45 percent of the region’s population, living
well below the poverty line, governments are everywhere obsessed with the “so-
cial question”: how to lance the putrefying slums—the favelas of Brazil, the villas
miserias of Argentina, the pueblos jovenes of Peru—and drain away their crime
and misery.
If only it were as simple as that. In a January 2002 report, the Brazilian gov-
ernment frankly admitted that it has lost control of the shantytowns around Rio
de Janeiro, which are in the hands of heavily armed, drug-running
paramilitaries, six thousand strong. The situation is even worse in São Paolo.
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Insert a lancet in either place, and the government is liable to provoke an armed
insurrection, by narcos and youth gangs like “Third Command,” toting machine
guns, light artillery, and rocket-propelled grenades. Other Latin American coun-
tries face similar distractions, which give the terrorists, forgers, drug dealers, and
other criminals time and impunity to sink their roots.
It is, for example, supposed that Muhammed Atta, who was a naturalized
Nicaraguan, carried at least two passports. (One of the 1993 World Trade Center
bombers had a sack full of blank Nicaraguan passports in his hotel room.) The
Islamist terrorists who blew up the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992 and
the city’s Jewish community center two years later fled into Argentina’s lawless
“triborder area”—the tropical northeastern strip where Argentina meets Para-
guay and Brazil—and have never been caught. It is now mooted by Jane’s that
Argentine investigators early on identified the Hezbollah assassins and traced
the bombings to Tehran, which, to forestall Israeli reprisals, allegedly resorted to
a time-honored South American dodge. Iran’s supreme leader paid ten million
dollars into Argentine president Carlos Menem’s Swiss bank account; we are
told that Menem obligingly called off the investigation, no doubt with one of
those roguish winks for which he is famous.
Democracy has replaced dictatorship in twenty-one of twenty-three Latin
American countries over the last twenty years, but these could not be called
strong democratic institutions. In many states of Latin America, law, order, and
public authority have receded so far as to be almost invisible. It is not that anar-
chy reigns—Latin Americans are generally too decent for that—but that terror-
ists and drug traffickers are able to settle and operate freely in many of the South
and Central American countries, using them as bases for their nefarious pur-
poses. Julio Cirino, an Argentine analyst, calls this the “essential territoriality” of
the so-called extraterritorial, transnational movements. “Shadowy, transna-
tional” operations like al-Qa‘ida or the Russian mafiya are often flagrantly na-
tional—that is, they lodge themselves in weak, failing states like Ecuador,
Colombia, Paraguay, or Suriname, building elaborate criminal and terrorist
infrastructures that seem “shadowy” to Americans only because we do not
know the half of what goes on inside them. For the new guerrillas, territorial
conquest has nothing to do with the 1970s theory of “liberated areas” (where a
more enlightened social model would be implanted); rather, it seeks soft spots
and gray areas inside sovereign states from which to operate criminal and ter-
rorist enterprises. Crime and complicity, of course, breed corruption, which in
turn further erodes public support for Latin America’s “democratic” govern-
ments. Drug trafficking earns Mexico thirty billion dollars a year—6 percent of
GDP—smearing fraud and chicanery through the entire system. Polling reveals
that more than two-thirds of Latin American governments are perceived by
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their citizens as being irreparably corrupt, what John Quincy Adams might have
termed “domiciles of despotism.”
Buenos Aires, usually throbbing beneath its ever-present cloud of smog, is to-
day oddly quiet. Shops are empty (or closed), pedestrians and revisteros—the
usually voluble newsstand operators—subdued. This great city of eleven million
is passing through its fifth year of recession, which by now feels like a depression.
The high-end shops are all deserted and garrisoned by armed security guards in
SWAT uniforms, on the lookout for the looters who occasionally appear to sack
boutiques and supermarkets. All middle-class Argentines—a dying breed after
the January 2002 devaluation—will tell you that this fat land of pampas and
rivers was among the world’s richest in 1914, with per capita income equal to
Germany and Holland, higher than Switzerland, Sweden, Italy, or Spain. Corn,
wheat, leather, wool, and beef—raised in the rich central grasslands and the vast
spaces of Patagonia—made fortunes in Argentina, which alone accounted for
half of Latin America’s total exports in 1914. You see traces of that wealth every-
where you go in Buenos Aires: the palatial railroad stations of Retiro and
Constitucíon (modeled on big-city stations in Liverpool and London); the ba-
roque headquarters of the newspaper La Prensa; the broad, jacaranda-lined
boulevards; the cool, clean sidewalks paved with Swedish granite; the elegant
northern barrio (district) of Recoleta—virtually indistinguishable from Paris’s
XVIth Arrondissement—and, of course, the Jockey Club, where the new porteño
(“people of the port”) dynasties—the Drysdales, Devotos, Bunges, Zuber-
bühlers—and the old—the Sáenz, Unzués, Anchorenas, Uriburus—mingled to
relish their wealth and standing.
The Jockey Club was the urban catch-basin of Argentina’s rural wealth, and
even today it shocks with its munificence—its massive portico, great hall, and
staircase paved and lined with marbles and statues that would not be out of place
in the Hofburg or the Louvre. Along the cool corridors are private dining rooms,
libraries, a gymnasium, and Turkish baths. The club, which sits in a quiet square
where rich Recoleta nudges up against the vast Avenida 9 de Julio, turns one’s
thoughts to that invincible Argentine phantom Juan Perón, who unleashed a
mob of workers and descamisados, shirtless slum dwellers, against the place in
1953. They tore through the Jockey Club’s gilded rooms and galleries, smashing,
burning, and defecating—Perón’s unsubtle way of reminding Argentina’s elite
who was boss in his new age of populism. It is a truism among middle-class Ar-
gentines that Perón destroyed all of the old prosperity with his ruinous expan-
sion of state spending in the 1940s and 1950s, but not before enriching the
porteño landscape with some of the finest fascist-style buildings to be found out-
side of Europe.
W A W R O 1 1 7
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Juan Domingo Perón, born in
1895 and come of age in Mussolini’s
Italy, where he served as Argentine
military attaché in the 1930s, was, of
course, himself a devoted fascist. He
invented pompous titles for him-
self—El Líder was his Argentine
equivalent of Duce or Führer—and
made his second wife, Eva, the Jefa,
or the “spiritual chief of the nation.”
Like Mussolini, Perón needed mon-
umental headquarters for all of the
vast new ministries and holding
companies he fledged after 1946.
The fortresslike “national director-
ates” of state industry—pocked with
bullet holes from various coup at-
tempts—suggest Perón’s grandiosity
but also the horrid inefficiency of his
so-called justicialist economy, which
differed little from Mussolini’s fas-
cist economy. A vast Justicialist Party
(the Partido Justicialista, or PJ), fat-
tened on those belle époque beef and
cereal revenues as well as on a steady
diet of foreign loans (as chronic a problem then as now), would insert itself be-
tween employers and employed to create “social justice”—precisely the model
so disastrously implemented by Mussolini and Hitler a generation earlier. Al-
though Argentina always had a Mediterranean penchant for bureaucracy, the
penchant became an inveterate habit in the 1950s, when Perón nationalized banks,
railroads, and factories and herded millions of Argentines into PJ-regulated labor
and agricultural unions. Argentina has never quite recovered from the shock.
Every impulse toward globalization or neoliberalismo is thwarted or checked by
the unions and the burden of the boons received in the 1940s: confiscatory taxa-
tion of the rich, food and energy subsidies, permanent employment, early pen-
sions, paid vacations, ninety days’ sick leave, prohibitive severance pay, and
annual bonuses that must be paid even to the most unproductive employees.
Still, my purpose in Argentina was not history or politics but vacation, and I
hoped to leave Peronist heaviness behind when our plane descended through
the clouds, skimmed over the Sierra de Cordoba and landed in San Luis. Our
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object was an estancia, or ranch, in the Traslasierra, a mountain-girt region be-
tween the Sierras and the Andean foothills. As this was Argentina, Peronist
heaviness almost immediately reasserted itself, for San Luis is the power base of
Adolfo Rodriguez Saá, more familiarly known as “El Adolfo.” Rodriguez Saá is a
Peronist who briefly held the presidency in January 2002 before being shoved
aside by Eduardo Duhalde, a more senior Justicialist. He is governor of San Luis
Province and runs it in the free-spending, patriarchal style of all the great pro-
vincial bosses, like Duhalde (Buenos Aires), Eduardo Angeloz (Cordoba), or
Carlos Menem (La Rioja). This became all too apparent during our four-hour
drive through empty country from San Luis to Merlo. Two lanes would have
been more than sufficient, but El Adolfo had generously given us four, plus
breakdown lanes, a median divider, expensive streetlamps every fifty yards or so,
and marvelous four-lane bridges over every creek and arroyo—this despite the
fact that we encountered no more than five cars on the entire trip. We passed the
new Santa Rosa International Airport—in the middle of nowhere—which has
been equipped with runways that can land jumbos, though there is only local
commuter air traffic in this bucolic region of alfalfa, ranching, and viticulture.
How to explain this reckless extravagance? By Argentine politics as usual—
besides being governor, El Adolfo is also a businessman, with extensive construc-
tion and manufacturing interests. According to our taxi driver, a denizen of San
Luis, Rodriguez Saá’s teams are doing most of the road and airport work, lining the
governor’s pocket in the process. Multiply this activity times a total of twenty-four
provincias and you begin to see how the demands of the local governors add to Ar-
gentina’s towering external debt, swelling the annual cost of Argentine debt service
from a barely manageable three billion dollars in 1990 to a backbreaking twelve bil-
lion last year. (Presidents Carlos Menem and Fernando de la Ruá routinely bor-
rowed abroad to meet the greedy demands of the governors—who, as the examples
of Duhalde, Rodriguez Saá, and Menem himself make clear, are often the same per-
son.) Of Argentina’s eleven-billion-dollar budget deficit in 2001, no less than three
billion dollars was generated by provincial governors, whose debts and regular de-
faults must in the last resort be assumed by Buenos Aires.
After five restful days at the ranch in the Traslasierra, we drove five hours to
Cordoba. There I saw my first cacerolaza, which is a pot-and-pan-banging street
demonstration amid flaming tires. The poor and middle-class are regularly in
the streets demanding jobs, money, food, and relief. Their anger is directed
against the “politicos, burocratos, tenteros,” and “ñoquis” of the Argentine Repub-
lic, not the International Monetary Fund, or the United States, or the Bank of
Boston. According to every Argentine citizen I spoke with, the weight of bureau-
cracy is crushing. The country has 329 senators and representatives for a popula-
tion of thirty-seven million, versus 535 for 278 million in the United States, and
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tens of thousands of civil servants, many of whom do little more than show up to
collect their pay (hence ñoqui, a reference to the Argentine custom of eating
gnocchi on payday). Tentero—groper, fondler—gives even more insight into the
Argentine conception of public service. After sinking his Buenos Aires apart-
ment and his entire life savings into a real estate development near the capi-
tal—buying, draining, and clearing the land, walling off the River Plate, building
s t ree t s , and digg ing a ma-
rina—my thirty-eight-year-old
Argentine brother-in-law saw the
entire venture ruined by provin-
cial bureaucrats, who frightened
off potential buyers and backers with their unending demands for bribes and ul-
timately refused the permits needed to finish the development. Today, three
years on, the land sits empty, a few courageous homesteaders hunkered down
amid my brother-in-law’s moldering improvements. Like thousands of other
young Argentines, he has fled to Spain in search of a real job.
An interesting detail: to plead his case my brother-in-law hired the best trial
lawyer in Argentina, who went to Eduardo Duhalde, then governor of Buenos
Aires Province, with recordings of the provincial officials demanding bribes.
Duhalde merely laughed: “The dumb bastards, they let themselves be taped,”
was his only comment. He thought it quite normal that the bureaucrats had
shaken down my brother-in-law and ruined him. Neither he nor anyone would
move against the tenteros, who were, after all, his own employees. Today Duhalde
wears the presidential sash and talks reform. Is it any wonder that the slogan of
the street demonstrators is “que se vayan todos”—everyone out? This is the rude
way in which you order a dog out of a room, and it reflects the now-universal as-
sumption in Argentina that every politician and bureaucrat must go before the
nation can repair itself.
Hiking along a mountain trail above Bariloche, in far Patagonia, I saw every
sign defaced with antibureaucratic graffiti, an oddity in a country where wall art
rarely rises above declarations of undying love (“Julio y Ana, siempre!”). Nowa-
days, a more typical graffito is “bastardos burocratos,” or perhaps “PJ = UCR”
(that is, the Peronist Party = the Radical Party). This sentiment would have been
unthinkable as late as 1990, when the Peronists—the party of the proletarian
compañeros, or comrades—fought every election against the bourgeois Civic
Radicals with class invective and bile. But these days they all seem the same, ex-
pensively tailored and thoroughly corrupt, altogether without sincere ideologi-
cal differences. Virtually every party headquarters I saw was painted with insults,
the most common being “putos” or “maricones.” Both words are slang for “ho-
mosexual,”which is considered an annihilating put-down in macho Argentina.
1 2 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
There is need for candor here, and Latin
American political institutions must be sub-
jected to hard scrutiny and criticism.
7
Wawro: Our Special Correspondent
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2002
In Bariloche, the Aspen or Chamonix of Argentina, I was struck by how slow
business is. The shops are full, but no one is buying. Such timid consumers are
everywhere; they’re called gasoleros, the sort of people who convert their cars to
natural gas to save a few bucks. Shops are out of things, because factories have
closed. I could find no shirts in my size, because the factories have furloughed
workers and suspended operations. This was the case even on the Calle Florida
in Buenos Aires, a principal shopping artery known in happier days as “Argen-
tina’s Bond Street.” The housing and car markets are flat. Because no one knows
what the correct price is for anything, no one will buy or sell. Pharmacies are
holding back prescription drugs, which are like a hard currency. Everyone awaits
the collapse of the peso—already well under way—and hyperinflation, both of
which are regarded as inevitable and restrained so far only by the regulated low
prices of oil and gas, which buffer costs in a vast, transport-dependent place like
Argentina.
Everyone I spoke with said the same thing—there is no visible exit. The only
way forward, they told me, is to tear down the life-sucking political/bureaucratic
superstructure and replace it with something better. “Que se vayan todos!” Ru-
mor has it that a vast e-mail campaign from the Argentine middle class is im-
ploring the IMF not to give money to Argentina, for it would only be stolen by
the politicians. The popular magazines—Gente, Caras, Noticias—lend credence
to the rumor. Accounts of former president (1990–2000) Carlos Menem’s cor-
ruption are astounding, and he has partied grossly through the latest crisis,
spending some of it in a four-thousand-dollar-a-night suite in Puerto Vallarta,
Mexico, with his young second wife, the beautiful Cecilia Bolocco of CNN en
Español. Before reaching Mexico the Menems stopped in Chile for golf and fa-
cials, all graphically depicted in the Argentine news. Argentines are furious and
disgusted, which is saying much, because this is a country that reveres beauty
and cosmetic surgery and generally thinks no price too high to pay for it. To a
historian, the conditions seem ripe for fascism. But there is no charismatic fas-
cist at hand, and the military has no intention of intervening, as the chief of the
naval staff explicitly stated to the press in late February.
Menem is constantly in the news. Incredibly, a not-insubstantial constituency
wants him to run for president again in 2003. They forgive his corruption on the
dubious grounds that he is efficient and will impress foreign creditors as a man
they can do business with. Duhalde, a real Peronist (Menem is a neoliberal in
Peronist clothing), has struck back, placarding the cities with posters of
Menem—his wrinkles Botox’ed into remission, his hair slicked and
pomaded—and the caption “Mal Bicho”—filthy little insect. Rodriguez Saá will
be the other contender, there being no serious candidate in the Radical ranks.
Raul Alfonsín (the most recognizable Radical and president from 1983 to 1989)
W A W R O 1 2 1
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was recently elected senator from Buenos Aires Province with just 7 percent of
the vote. He is still despised for the 5,000 percent inflation of 1989 (when super-
market managers yelled minute-by-minute price changes over their public-
address systems to wild-eyed shoppers) and was elected only through typical
Argentine horse trading, by which the runner-up party in every province is assured
one of the province’s three Senate seats, no matter how derisory their vote.
The rising political star is former Civic Radical Alicia Carrio, nicknamed
“Lelita,” who is gaining ground with her new party, the Allianza para una
Republica de Iguales. Like the Italian magistrates who made their names in “Op-
eration Clean Hands,” Carrio came to public attention by her hard line on cor-
ruption and money laundering, bashing the Menems and their in-laws, the
Yomas, and their assorted hangers-on. As the name suggests—Alliance for a Re-
public of Equals—her party is a populist movement that would attack the
mounting social problems with greater energy and deploy a safety net for the
declassed and the underclass.
A party known as “1810”—formed by “young professionals” in April 2002
and named for the year in which the porteños armed themselves and drove the
British from Buenos Aires—pulls no punches in its fight against what 1810 (like
most Argentines) calls the “barrio culture and chicanery” of Duhalde and Con-
gress. “Duhalde,” an 1810 spokesman recently said, “is an unworldly street kid
trying to rip off the country with the usual street crime. He doesn’t know how to
think like a Yanqui”—a disqualifying shortcoming in a networked, globalized
world. 1810 would “re-found the nation” through a “technocratic revolution”
orchestrated by the party’s Ivy League and Oxbridge-educated cadres.
I met for several hours one afternoon with a number of active-duty and re-
tired Argentine naval officers at the Armada’s Center for Strategic Studies in the
Nuñez district of Buenos Aires. We made a brisk tour of Latin American prob-
lems, and I found their interpretations of those problems at least as interesting
as their actual evidence. The Argentines are especially worried about penetra-
tion of Latin America by the People’s Republic of China; they point to the ship-
ping company Hutchinson-Wampoa as a typical PRC venture in which the
“cargo business” is used as cover for intelligence collection and the movement of
contraband weapons, goods, and people. They all insisted that Washington’s re-
cent decision to re-require visas of Argentines was directed not against terrorism
but against the PRC, which has been running a profitable racket moving wealthy
Chinese to Argentina and providing them with identity cards and Argentine
passports, all for ten thousand dollars. Many, they told me, have entered that way
and moved on to the United States. (This would be another perfect example of
the corruption of Argentine bureaucrats—the racket is allegedly run through
the Argentine embassy in Beijing, where crooked consuls sell the visas and
1 2 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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arrange the cartas de identidad, doubtless paying off the Argentine Interior Min-
istry in the process.) Though fascinated by the officers’ revelations, I replied that
it was my understanding that George W. Bush had ended President Clinton’s
visa waiver because of the flood of Argentines, many with Arab surnames, into
the United States, where many of them have gone to ground. None agreed with
this interpretation, insisting upon
the Chinese threat. (A week later I
raised the same question with Peru-
vian naval officers and mentioned
the Argentine worries. They hooted
with laughter: “The Chinese?” a
Peruvian admiral asked me incredulously. “They run shops and sell chifa [South
American Chinese food] down here, and that’s about it.”)
I asked the Argentine naval officers if they regard Brazil, with its 172 million
people and trillion dollar GDP, as a threat. “Yes,” they chorused—not an overt
military threat but a great, steaming pot that can boil over at any time. Indeed, at
a conservative estimate, fifty million Brazilians live below the poverty line, and
debilitating scandals continue to rock the government. President Collor de
Mello was impeached and removed for corruption in 1992, and the country’s
most senior legislator was removed last year for rigging congressional votes.
Public schools are bad, wages are low, strikes and illegal land seizures are in-
creasing, unemployment and crime are high, jails are horribly overcrowded, and
electrical power (think air conditioning) is stingily rationed. The Brazilian mur-
der rate keeps rising, as do rates of violent and juvenile crimes, which are jump-
ing 90 percent a year in places like Rio. Brazil also has a far larger foreign debt
than Argentina (four hundred billion dollars), and it only increases with each
devaluation of the real. Add to these problems restive political parties, drug traf-
fickers, and a broad landless-peasant movement, which has spread into Argen-
tina, occupying and partitioning big farms and ranches, and you have the
makings of an unholy mess. My Argentine interlocutors called Brazil “a failed
state in the making” and rued the overt collaboration between narcos in Brazil
and Colombia. Colombian cocaine producers fly much of their product to U.S.
markets from sixteen jungle airstrips in Brazil. The Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC) provided Brazilian drug kingpin Fernandinho Beira Mar’s
security detail until he was captured in 2000. The Argentines fear that if the
narcos are squeezed out of Colombia they will migrate to the vast spaces of
Brazil—a fear shared by the Brazilians themselves, who have lately moved
twenty-five thousand troops and airmen into the Amazon region.
When I later posed the question of Brazil to the Peruvians, they answered in a
similar vein. Downplaying Brazil’s naval ambitions—purchase of the French
W A W R O 1 2 3
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aircraft carrier Foch, indigenous submarine-building capability, and a nuclear-
propulsion program—the Peruvian officers, like the Argentines, returned again
and again to Brazil’s social crisis. “Brazil’s problem,” one officer opined, “is its
people. The country is a lot like India or China, where a few rich areas must sub-
sidize huge, desperately poor provinces.” The Peruvians reckon that 70 percent
of Brazil is poor and must be maintained by the rich South, draining away most
if not all of Brazil’s great power potential. Indeed, the Peruvians view Brazil
chiefly as a makeweight against what they consider the much more serious re-
gional threat, Chile.
Like the Argentines, the Peruvians worry about Chile’s prosperity and its re-
cent decision to purchase ten F-16 C/Ds and two KC-135A Stratotankers. It is
not that the F-16s and KC-135s pose a direct threat—no one seriously contem-
plates war in the region—but that they so outclass and outrange Peru’s MiGs
and Argentina’s Skyhawks that neither Peru nor Argentina feels that it has
much diplomatic leverage with Chile any more. If Peru scrambled warplanes to
protest Chilean encroachment on its maritime frontier, the Chilean F-16s—with
their stand-off missiles, advanced navigation and targeting systems, and
conformal (streamlined) fuel tanks—would fly rings around them, at the very
least. The Chilean purchase of 250 Leopard tanks, two Franco-Spanish
Scorpene-class submarines and four (perhaps eight) German-built Meko frig-
ates only adds to the pressure. When I raised Chile’s $660 million F-16 pur-
chase with the Argentines, one defense analyst quipped, “We’re not worried,
because we’re rearming with Spitfires!” There were laughs all around, but pri-
vately Argentina is concerned, since the Chilean arms purchases—in view of
Argentina’s depreciated military—give Chile uncontested superiority in the
Beagle Channel, the Drake Passage, and the Magellan Straits. These narrows
are all still regarded as strategically vital, for they connect the oceans and are
the best roads to Antarctica—which is, of course, disputed by Argentina and
Chile.
All of this dreadful, unexpected prognosticating was not without its effect on
me. Later, when I strolled through the Peruvian Naval War College on the breezy
Punta of Callao, my escort paused to point out the visiting Chilean student.
Where formerly I would have seen just another war college student in a crisp
white uniform idly flicking through his e-mail, I now saw a Prussian officer
among Austro-Hungarians: imperious, cool, and self-assured. My mind—al-
ways prone to metaphor—was clearly playing tricks on me.
At the Argentine Center for Strategic Studies I asked, “Will Mercosur [the
Brazilian, Argentine, Uruguayan, and Paraguayan common market] ever have a
military-security framework like the European Union’s?” “No,” they all agreed.
“Argentina is interested, but Brazil is not.” They compared Brazil’s position in
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Latin America to that of Gaullist France in Europe—it wants to stand apart and
insist on self-help and reliance. Also, as ever, there is no money for a collabora-
tive Mercosur army or navy. I asked if Argentina seeks a “special relationship”
with the United States like that of the United Kingdom. They all agreed that no
one in the government has taken any position on this since the departure of
Menem, who was very much in that pro-American vein.* (This too made
Menem a mal bicho in the eyes of the Peronists, who are traditionally nonaligned
and anti-American.) A naval captain gave me the best exposition of the Argen-
tine position—“Good relations with Brazil as a hedge against Chile, good rela-
tions with the U.S. as a hedge against Brazil.”
According to these gentlemen, the Argentine military is the most pro-American
group in the country. Of course, Argentina has always been the least “American”
country in the hemisphere, because of its European immigration and character
and its proud, now largely forgotten, intention to be the dominant state in South
America. Argentina’s political parties have always been more European in out-
look than those of many other South American nations, for they incline toward
Europe’s “social market” philosophy. Raul Alfonsín has explicitly called for
better relations with the EU in preference to the United States, and even the
Menemista wing of the PJ will not explicitly call for partnership with the United
States, because of fears and rhetoric of Yanqui domination. However, people in
the Argentine streets are very pro-American, by and large—though such larger
political and philosophical questions have now been subsumed by economic
worries.
As I walked those Argentine streets one last time before departing for Peru, I
became aware of something I had never noticed before—how many of Buenos
Aires’s main avenues are named for Peruvian battles. Suipacha, Junin, and
Ayacucho are three major streets in the capital, and they are named for the
Napoleonic-era battles in Peru’s altiplano and central highlands that drove the
Spanish from Lima and briefly placed the country under Argentine influence.
The Argentine presence withered quickly, not least because Peru is a different
world from Argentina. Whereas Argentina—populated by great waves of Euro-
pean immigrants—is a “white” country, the majority in Peru are Quechua
Amerindians or mixed-blood mestizos; also, the Andean region is nothing like
the pampas of Argentina. (Alberto Fujimori’s successful tactic in his first run at
the Peruvian presidency—pitting mixed-blood cholitos against criollo, or Euro-
pean-descended, “blanquitos”—would never catch fire in a country like Argen-
tina, where 97 percent of the population are blanquitos.) Argentina and Peru are
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distinct cultures, presenting different challenges, which is why I wanted to visit
Peru. The Andean zone, which comprises Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and parts of
Colombia and Venezuela, is the flank of South America most worrying to the
United States. Home to a hundred million people, the region is an important
trading partner and oil supplier but also the principal supplier of cocaine, mari-
juana and, increasingly, heroin in North America.
Days later, I stood in the Plaza San Martín in Lima, admiring a relic of Peru’s
golden age that connected the country that I had just left with the one in which I had
just arrived. Constructed in 1921 to commemorate Argentine general José San
Martín’s liberation of Peru from the Spanish, the plaza’s grand neo-Renaissance
buildings are nowadays chipped and faded. Litter blows through the empty ar-
cades, and those shops and offices not taken over by porn theaters are hung with
signs that read “Se vende oficinas”—offices for sale. History meant to be puffed
up with nationalist pride hangs slackly. Preoccupied pedestrians amble past the
heroic statue of San Martín on horseback without a glance. Peru, in short, is do-
ing little better than Argentina. Economies that were in a fifth year of recession
before 11 September 2001 have plunged deeper since.
You notice this the moment you leave the Lima airport and drive into Callao,
a gritty, working-class barrio between the airport and the capital. Once the rich-
est port on the South American seaboard, Callao is being slowly strangled by
shantytowns that now press up against the walls of the naval base. Sailors and
naval officers have actually been assaulted attempting to get to work, or so I was
told by a Peruvian lieutenant, who avoided one particular gate because, he said,
youths lie in wait there to throw chunks of pavement through car windows and
mug the occupants. Most noticeable in Callao are the hordes of unemployed,
young men idling in the streets and alleys with nothing to do. This explains the
surge of street crime in Peru’s cities, where tourists are advised to hang nothing
from their shoulders and to leave their wallets in the hotel safe. Most tourists,
however, never set foot in places like Callao, or even Lima centro, for the whole
capital is shifting, American-style, to the suburbs. You feel the change as your
taxi skirts the old colonial center and charges up to Miraflores and San Isidro,
the modern, distant, and safe quarters of Lima, where the rich and well con-
nected live and play. This is strange, for downtown Lima is arguably South
America’s most exquisite Spanish colonial capital, with its sprawling royal pal-
ace, broad plazas and alamedas (parks), massive cathedral and convents, and
handsome colonial mansions with barred windows and carved oak balconies.
Yet the whole place is being ditched for the suburbs, leaving half-deserted streets
that feel like Detroit, whose glorious remnants of the Gilded Age have long since
been abandoned for soulless new places like Auburn Hills and Novi.
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San Isidro is no different from Recoleta or Belgrano in Buenos Aires—or
from Birmingham, Michigan, to carry the Detroit analogy a final step forward.
Thronged with handsome young blanquitos in their private-school uniforms, it
sports elegant boutiques and beauty salons filled with chattering criollos. In a
country that is 82 percent Amerindian or mestizo, this hints at the wealth and
influence still wielded by the old Spanish elites. Miraflores, which overlooks the
sandy beaches of the Pacific, is jammed with upscale clubs, discos, bars, and res-
taurants. If Lima centro has incomparable sixteenth-century palaces and ecclesi-
astical buildings, Miraflores has Larcomar, an ocean-facing, American-style
shopping mall filled with American food and entertainment franchises. “Todo
plastico”—all fakery—was a Peruvian friend’s exasperated comment.
Like Argentina, Peru endlessly laments its economy, which headlines every
newspaper and news program. Negative economic growth in a country that had
become used to expansion in the 1990s has fatally undermined President
Alejandro Toledo, who took office
a year ago with high hopes. He
had successfully vanquished the
Fujimori-Montesinos cabal and
proudly emphasized his Amerin-
dian roots, a first in Peru. His
party, Peru Posible, offered a bright future of education and development. An es-
timated four hundred million dollars had fled offshore with Fujimori’s demise,
but those sums not actually squirreled away by Fujimori and Montesinos in their
wildly corrupt last years were expected to return in due course. But now, after
tempering the harshest aspects of Fujimori’s neoliberalism, Toledo finds himself
stranded between two stools—unappreciated by the conservative Right and un-
der attack from a resurrected Alan Garcia’s populistas on the Left.
“Resurrected Alan Garcia” has an ironic ring even to those Peruvians who
will probably vote for him (en masse) in the 2006 elections. Alan Garcia—just
“Alan” to his admirers—was, after all, the father of 8,000 percent inflation in
the 1980s, when a lack of soles (the Peruvian currency) was viewed as no obsta-
cle to orgiastic public spending. Garcia merely printed more of them, so many
that a new currency, the nuevo sol, had to be invented to erase the memory of
the old one. During the week that I spent in Peru, President Toledo was in
Brazil, warning against the “seductive whispers” (susurrantes) of the populists,
by which he meant Garcia, who was pushing a slate of candidates for imminent
legislative elections.
The Garcia phenomenon is by no means confined to Peru. Argentina was un-
dergoing a bout of it when I left, though Eduardo Duhalde—never out of a suit
and thick with ill-gotten prosperity—is as improbable a populist as Kenneth
W A W R O 1 2 7
The days when the vast silos and frigoríficos
of Rosario, Buenos Aires, and Bahia Blanca
fed the world are long gone, and more Argen-
tines are now fighting over a smaller pie.
14
Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 3, Art. 4
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss3/4
Lay. Ecuador’s president took Toledo aside in Brazil and expressed his support
for the struggle against “Mr. Simpatía,” which might loosely be translated as
“Mr. All Things to All People.” That would be Alan Garcia and those like him
who pander to the millions of illiterate and uneducated voters who crowd Peru’s
slums and backcountry. Fujimori’s economic shock treatment did ignite an eco-
nomic miracle in the 1990s (32 percent growth in gross domestic product by
1997), but Peru somehow remains a typically backward Andean country.
Fifty-four percent of its twenty-five million citizens live in abject poverty, and 75
percent of its working age population is underemployed, toiling for average
wages of a hundred dollars, per month at most, or unemployed altogether.
Populism in the Andean region battens on this poverty, as well as on levels of
analfabetismo (illiteracy) that, at first blush, seem more appropriate to the six-
teenth century than the twenty-first. In a large, relatively prosperous provincial
department like Cusco, where I traveled to see Machu Picchu, illiteracy is said to
hover around 40 percent—“is said,” because official government statistics claim
89 percent literacy nationwide. Locals laugh at such claims. Fujimori built a mil-
lion new schools during his presidency to cut into the problem, but rural and ur-
ban children continue to cut classes routinely. In the country, the nearest school
is often miles away. The exhausting walk or mule ride has to be weighed against
pressure to work at home. In the city, finite energy is better devoted to scraping a
living from odd jobs or street crime. Teachers are notoriously unmotivated.
Earning a thousand dollars a year (in a country where a cheeseburger, fries, and
soda cost two dollars), they have little choice but to work three or four jobs and
to minimize their hours in the classroom to make time for cab driving and other
more profitable vocations. When I asked a Lima businessman why the govern-
ment does not simply pay teachers more, he replied that Fujimori had consid-
ered that but demurred when advised that every other union would demand
equivalent pay increases. So more schools were built—brick and mortar being
docile commodities—but teachers were kept on at a hundred dollars a month.
Their motto may as well be the old Soviet one—“The government pretends to
pay us, and we pretend to work.”
This shortage of education helps explain Garcia’s resurgence. At least half of
the young population has no memory of the 1980s, and many of the rest passed
the decade in a fog of ignorance. In the heart of Cusco province, the walls of ev-
ery house, building, and market are painted with electoral propaganda. Whereas
a country like Argentina brackets the names of candidates with all the usual
promises—“hope, education, jobs”—in Peru there is far less sloganeering, be-
cause the messages would be lost on tens of thousands of illiterate voters. Thus,
each candidate has a pictorial symbol, and this is painted on walls with an X
through it, enjoining the illiterate voter to mark that symbol on his ballot.
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Fujimori’s symbol (retained by his party, “Peru 2000”) is a tractor, Toledo’s is a T,
and Garcia’s is a star, sometimes a pigeon. Accion Popular—a rival party to Gar-
cia’s American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA)—appears on the ballot
(and the walls of Cusco province) as a shovel. Literate voters are lured with the
occasional slogan—“Alan por el agro,” Alan for agriculture—but mostly you see
the symbol and an X and the no doubt useless (because unreadable) injunction
“Marca así!”—mark your ballot this way!
Rattling along the rails to Machu Picchu, you can look directly into peasant
huts and see the squalor, the large families in tattered clothing sprawled on dirt
floors, gazing absently into space. “What possible motivation do people like this
have to vote?” I asked a Peruvian on the train. Apathy seemed a far more likely
outcome than a vote even for Alan Garcia or any other populist. “Plenty,” he an-
swered. “Voting is mandatory; if the peasant doesn’t vote, he must pay a fine of
fifty soles, which would ruin him.” That I could well imagine. Fifty soles is twelve
dollars, which goes a long way in a poor country like Peru. Not voting is plainly
not an option, so most people either cast a blank ballot (30 percent in the last
elections) or vote for the candidate promising the most, which is always Garcia,
whom they call, affectionately or knowingly, “el caballo loco”—the crazy horse
(“crazy” for his deficit spending, but also for his rumored dependence on
antidepressants).
Out of power, populists like Garcia can promise the world; in power, politi-
cians like Toledo (a Stanford Ph.D. and World Bank economist, by way of a fam-
ily of thirteen and a shoeshine box in the impoverished coastal town of
Chimbote) are reduced to a fiscal realism that never fails to disappoint.
Grim-faced, Toledo is always uttering things like, “I prefer to begin badly so that
we end up well,” or “We must see things through, whatever the cost.” There is
massive pressure on him to do otherwise. One political cartoon I saw while in
Lima was of a perplexed Toledo listening intently to a devil whispering in his ear.
Above the horns, the pointed ears, and the Mephistophelean goatee was the
word “populismo.”
Garcia, who derides the less stylish and media-savvy Toledo as “a pilot who
asks the passengers how to fly the plane,” evinces no such doubts. Instead, he
pins his hopes on a deluge of state and provincial spending, an approach that
would certainly cut against the flow of regional and historical experience. Even
as Argentina faints from its rich diet of debt and spending, Garcia proposes the
same, pledging a “massive expansion” of social-working bureaucracy and
state-sponsored agriculture, to be mediated through the deep layers of Peru-
vian administration that descend from Lima to the regions to the departments
to the provinces to the districts. (Cusco, just one of twenty-four Peruvian
departamentos, contains fifteen provinces subdivided into fifty districts, each
W A W R O 1 2 9
16
Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 3, Art. 4
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss3/4
entity with its own mayor or governor and extensive administration.) Garcia
would reimpose Perón-style labor laws repealed by Fujimori and flush yet more
money through the system to create jobs and prosperity. The countervailing evi-
dence, however, is along the side of the road, where squat Quechua women stag-
ger along beneath crushing loads of grass and cereal to make bread or to feed the
guinea pigs (cayes) that are grilled and eaten as a main source of protein.
An American engineer I spoke with near Cusco said that his company had im-
ported twenty-six thousand dollars’ worth of machinery to assist in the con-
struction of a railway. Yet each time he visits the locally recruited crews, he finds
them hard at work with their hand drills and spades, the power equipment sit-
ting unused under tarps. With most campesinos content with this Breughelian
subsistence, Peru ends up importing 70 percent of its corn, sugar, potatoes, and
rice. (If this sad statistic were ever to penetrate the mountain tombs of the Incas,
who sculpted vast agricultural terraces that produced so much food that only
two-thirds was eaten, the rest given to God, they would roll in their caves.) Eye-
ing Peru’s lush farmlands, like the Chinchero region near Cusco, where corn,
wheat, and potatoes fairly explode from the rich, red soil, Garcia wants to ex-
pand local production (“Alan por el agro”). But as one Cusceño skeptic told me,
it has been tried before and failed. Indeed, it was the failure of so many of Peru’s
agricultural enterprises that drove Fujimori to privatize them in the 1990s. Fed
on easy credit, campesinos borrowed heavily and never repaid their debts, forc-
ing the government to borrow abroad to cover the losses at home. Like the
Quechua woman bent under her sheaves of grass, Peru continues to stagger un-
der its foreign debt, which, at twenty-eight billion dollars, is an eye-popping 35
percent of GDP.
Every conversation I had in Peru veered to the “Shining Path,” the Sendero
Luminoso. The guerrilla war of the 1980s and 1990s is seared in Peru’s memory
no less than Vietnam in ours. Although conventional wisdom holds that Garcia
was too soft on the terrorists and Fujimori, perhaps, too hard, the press exposed
a sensational story while I was there in March 2002—that more than half of
Peru’s 4,022 desaparecidos (those “disappeared,” killed, by the military) vanished
during Garcia’s presidency. With the facility that makes the military loathe him,
Garcia hastened to assert that “the military did all that behind my back” (a
espaldas de mi gobierno). Naval officers I spoke with in Callao, some of whom
had served in the counterinsurgency campaign, laughed at the pretense.
Garcia, they said, had pushed consistently, but secretly, for tough measures and
was always quick to point the finger at the military whenever things got out of hand.
He disassociated himself, for example, from the Lurigancho prison massacre in
1986, when government troops retook the Lima jail after an inmate uprising and
used the opportunity to execute a hundred Senderista prisoners gangland-style,
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with bullets in the back of the head. Most officers assumed that Garcia—frantic
at the expansion of terrorism—had authorized the assassinations. Stuck with
the entire odium of Lurigancho, the Peruvian military thereafter refused to un-
dertake operations against Shining Path without written orders from the presi-
dent. This reluctance led to the almost unimaginable tragedy of Tocache in 1988,
when Sendero guerrillas surrounded a police post in Peru’s San Martín department
and opened fire on the defenders. For eight hours Peruvian radio and television car-
ried the beleaguered garrison’s desperate appeals to a nearby army air cavalry unit,
which refused to chopper over without written orders from Garcia. The orders
never arrived, and every policeman in the post was killed.
As in the United States, many of Peru’s protest generation and most of the
vanguard of Sendero and Tupac Amaru (a Marxist-Leninist movement even
more violent than the Shining Path) were educated, middle-class youths from
nice suburbs like San Isidro and Barranco. The problem for a politician like Garcia,
running the APRA party machine,
was that many of the terrorists
were the sons and daughters of
prominent party members, who
had to be coddled. This led to the
sensational case of Victor Polay,
head of Tupac Amaru. Captured
in 1988, Polay, the son of an APRA party boss, was visited in his cell by a proces-
sion of prominent Apristas, including Alan Garcia’s prime minister. Somehow
Polay “escaped” from his maximum security prison after just three months, slip-
ping through an unguarded tunnel in the night.
The anguished way in which naval officers recounted this story to me
spoke volumes about the distrust that lingers between Garcia and the armed
forces. Garcia, after all, nearly destroyed the Peruvian military in the 1980s,
methodically corrupting and dividing it to coup-proof the country. The rather
sordid process, officially known as “co-optation,” purchased the loyalty of se-
nior Peruvian generals and admirals with ministries, embassies, and state-
sponsored entrée to the cocaine trade. This, in its turn, led to the COMACA
(“Comandantes, Majors, and Captains”), a junior officers’ revolt that accused
APRA and the military leadership of “fostering terrorism, abuse, and injus-
tice.” Had Fujimori not triumphed in 1990—the year that Sendero proclaimed
“strategic equilibrium” in the country and girded for a final offensive—Peru
may well have descended into a vicious three or four-cornered civil war.
Victor Polay, recaptured in 1992 when APRA was out of the picture, is back in
jail—this time guarded by Peruvian SEALs in a navy facility where former
Shining Path leader Abimael Guzmán and Fujimori’s ex–spy chief Vladimiro
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Montesinos are also held. The naval officers I met took me to see the prison, in
an isolated section of their Callao base. I stood staring at the little building for
several minutes as the sun sank into the Pacific. Inside were Peru’s three horse-
men of the apocalypse, the two founders of terror and the feline bureaucrat who
shivered Peru down to its foundations to destroy the revolution.
Everyone in the Peruvian government has a Montesinos story. Although he is
locked up under heavy guard, no one quite believes that he is under control.
Born in Arequipa in 1946, Montesinos joined the Peruvian army and graduated
from the U.S. Army’s School of the Americas in 1965 before joining SIN, an
ill-chosen acronym for Peru’s National Intelligence Service. With the breezy im-
morality that marked his entire career, Montesinos began spying on his own
country for the Central Intelligence Agency. The period was, as one analyst drily
put it, “the only time in history when Peru had secrets worth keeping and there-
fore worth selling.” A leftist military regime had ousted President Fernando
Belaunde in 1968 and embraced the Soviet Union, shocking Richard Nixon’s ad-
ministration. Wheedling and intriguing, Montesinos became the principal aide
of General Edgardo Mercado (“South America’s Clausewitz,” in Montesinos’s
flattering judgment), who became prime minister in 1973. An American who
met Captain Montesinos in the 1970s remarked that he was never in uni-
form—indeed, did not even seem to have an office. He just floated around head-
quarters in mufti, spinning his web. An Argentine journalist in exile in Lima
recalls visiting Montesinos’s house at that time. To impress his Argentine friend,
Montesinos opened a wall safe and removed top-secret Peruvian military plans
for a war with Augusto Pinochet’s Chile; Montesinos had stolen the originals
from Mercado’s office and taken them home. (One wonders what would have
happened had war ever broken out.) Even when later accused of selling the
prime minister’s weekly agenda and lists and manuals of Soviet weaponry to the
CIA, Montesinos got off lightly, for, as would become a pattern, he had powerful
friends and no less powerful information.
Cast out of the army and imprisoned for just twelve months (the army did
not want to stain Mercado’s reputation by making an issue of the rather sordid
Montesinos), he began a law career defending drug traffickers. This again was
very much in character, and profitable at a time when Peru provided the bulk of
North America’s cocaine. (Fujimori’s scorched-earth policy subsequently re-
duced Peruvian coca acreage by 65 percent, forcing Montesinos to adjust, in ef-
fect bartering coca eradication for the regime-sustaining goodwill and
approbation of the U.S. government, while redoubling cocaine production and
sales on the remaining acreage and commencing a profitable gunrunning opera-
tion to the Colombian FARC.) Montesinos has always had a fetish for informa-
tion and control; prim and austere, he has devoted his entire life to building
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networks and cataloging the crimes, peccadilloes, and penchants of Peru’s elites.
(Toledo, for example, was once photographed by Montesinos’s agents leaving
Los Suites de Barranco, Lima’s best brothel.) As a lawyer, Montesinos mapped
the avenues of government like no one else, which is how he met and won over
Alberto Fujimori. Accused on the brink of his presidential victory in 1990 of real
estate fraud and tax evasion, Fujimori—the suddenly shamefaced candidate of
“honesty, technology, and work”—turned to Montesinos, who, with a few
phone calls, made the incriminating records (and charges) disappear. Fujimori
went on to defeat novelist Mario Vargas Llosa in the general election.
From that point forward, Peruvians aver, Montesinos, who ran SIN but never
took a title grander than “counselor to the president,” owned Fujimori. “El
Chino,” as the president was fondly if inaccurately known (he is of Japanese, not
Chinese, extraction), fended off every effort to get at Montesinos in the 1990s,
whether by the Peruvian opposition, dissidents in the armed forces, the U.S. em-
bassy, or international opinion—which sharply criticized the auto-golpe or
“self-coup” of 1992, when Fujimori, guided by Montesinos, shuttered Parlia-
ment, declared a “government of national emergency and reconstruction,” and
sent “oblivion commandos” into the justice and financial ministries to cart away
all documents that might incriminate Fujimori, Montesinos, or their allies.
(When the military hesitated to back the self-coup, Fujimori panicked and fled to
the Japanese embassy before being calmly talked back to the presidential palace by
Montesinos, who, as usual, arranged everything to everyone’s satisfaction.)
It is, of course, assumed that Montesinos retained the most incriminating
documents seized by the “oblivion commandos” to strengthen his hold on those
around him, which would explain in part the slow speed of Peru’s ongoing
Montesinos investigation—no one dares open this Pandora’s box all the way.
The ex–spy chief kept scrupulous records of all the bribery that held Fujimori’s
Peru on course—ten thousand dollars to this congressman, fifteen thousand to
that judge, two million to a newspaper that obligingly smeared El Chino’s critics.
On the presidential payroll as a mere assessor, at eighteen thousand dollars a
year, Montesinos (who has seventy million dollars stashed away in the frozen
bank accounts identified thus far) passed his time compiling a library of 2,700
videotapes, all documenting politicians, soldiers, bureaucrats, and journalists
engaged in compromising transactions of one sort or another. (In one of these
“Vladivideos”—from March 2000—Montesinos sits with the Arab mayor of a
Peruvian town discussing al-Qa‘ida’s free use of Peru as a “transit area” and
“resting place” in its operations against the United States.) With this material as
well as transcripts and recordings of illegal wiretaps, Montesinos gradually
wrapped his hands around everyone’s neck until Fujimori was unexpectedly
forced from office two years ago. This ouster came as a shock to Montesinos,
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who fled to Venezuela in Imelda Marcos–like haste, leaving a thousand Christian
Dior shirts in his closet. He was captured in Caracas in 2001 after a nine-month
manhunt, seized while attempting to withdraw seven hundred thousand dollars
from one of his many offshore accounts.
The man remains a Peruvian institution; when I complimented a Peruvian
admiral on the efficiency of his aide (who had shown me around Callao), he
ca l l ed the of f i cer “my
Montesinos.” Even in prison,
Montesinos agitates. The naval of-
ficers I spoke with said that he re-
mains as imperious as ever,
demanding treats and privileges
as if he were still at the top of SIN and the “Grupo Colina” death squad that he
formed to kidnap and kill subversives. No one quite knows what to make of
him—one officer called him “Peru’s Rasputin”—and Montesinos himself is
convinced that this latest spell in prison will be as brief as his first one.
On the way from Cusco to see the Inca fortress at Pisac, I asked my cab driver
if he had ever actually seen a communist guerrilla with his own eyes. “Yes,” he
said. “About fifteen years ago, I was helping my father, who was a truck driver,
carry a load of goods through the Andes from Cusco to Puerto Maldonado. We
were up very high, maybe three thousand meters, descending slowly through
snowfields, when we rounded a bend and saw them. There were five or six guer-
rillas with machine guns; they all wore ponchos and ski masks and had blocked
the road with boulders.” After “inviting” the father and son to step down, the
guerrillas gave them an impromptu lecture on “the social struggle against capi-
talists and imperialists” and then “requested” a “donation.” My driver’s father
correctly took the “donation” to be obligatory, and paid $150, a huge sum of
money, but only a fraction of what Peru’s long-distance drivers carry with them
to purchase diesel, supplies, and pay their stevedores—a fact known to the
Senderistas, who were not without their own capitalist instincts. “What did the
guerrillas sound like,” I asked. “Like peasants?” “No,” he laughed, “like students,
like Limeños. They were educated middle-class, the ones who went into the rural
areas to convert the poor.” We drove on for a few miles, and then he added an in-
teresting detail. “That’s how the military caught a lot of guerrillas in the prov-
inces. They would sidle up to a campesino, start a conversation, and listen to his
words. Poorly educated to begin with, if the peasant unguardedly dropped in
phrases like ‘the struggle,’ or ‘the cause,’ or ‘the social question,’ it was pretty ob-
vious that he was a guerrilla or had been to a guerrilla school.”
My taxi driver shouted these stories over his shoulder as if they were history,
sad chapters from Peru’s violent past. He must have been no less startled than the
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rest of the country when a car bomb desolated a street near the U.S. embassy in
Lima in March 2002, missing its target but blowing to pieces a young man on
rollerblades and other innocent bystanders. Although the Toledo government
had acknowledged the activity of “several hundred” Sendero diehards in the
coca-producing backcountry (where they collaborate with FARC across the bor-
der), Toledo had never expected Shining Path’s “Lima Metropolitan Commit-
tee”—the cells charged with urban terrorism—to reconstitute themselves. This
intelligence failure, which must have worried President Bush as he landed in
Lima just three days after the blast, forces a sober reassessment of Peru’s recent
history, an analysis that suggests unpleasant answers. Everyone’s first reaction
was to blame Toledo for dismantling Fujimori’s lethal National Counterterrorism
Directorate (DINCOTE) and thus permitting Shining Path to regroup, but closer
study reveals that Fujimori himself conceded the respite. With Guzmán and
Polay under lock and key in 1992, Fujimori shifted most of DINCOTE’s func-
tions (and its best personnel) to the task of investigating, smearing, and harass-
ing El Chino’s most likely opponents in the 1995 presidential election campaign.
Deprived of its eyes and ears, the Peruvian military failed to register Ecuador’s ag-
gressive intentions in 1995 (when an Ecuadorian incursion across a disputed sec-
tion of the border produced a brief war and eventually an internationally sponsored
settlement) and suffered humiliation when Tupac Amaru seized and held the Japa-
nese embassy in Lima for 124 days in 1996–97. We now know that Fujimori and
Montesinos were aware that the Peruvian terror groups were merely in “strategic
hibernation” after 1992—Sendero gravitating into the pueblos jovenes around big
cities—but had chosen to claim final victory in the terrorist struggle and redeploy
intelligence assets to serve their internal-political ambitions.
On assuming office last year, Toledo merely gave his stamp of approval to
changes already begun by Fujimori and his successor, Valentin Paniagua, who in
six self-mutilating months as interim president in 2000–2001 had dissolved SIN,
decentralized Peru’s intelligence collection, and conceded “international stan-
dard” amenities to Guzmán and Polay, including newspapers, pay telephones,
and regular access to lawyers, relatives, and friends. It is supposed that, thus em-
powered, Guzmán gave the orders for the March car bombing from his cell. True
to form—Toledo is considered a bumbler—Peru’s president belatedly called for
“the accelerated reconstruction of the national intelligence system” and the rees-
tablishment of counterinsurgency posts in rural departments most threatened
by Shining Path. The horsemen of the apocalypse are racing again for the barn
door, yet only now—with his approval rating down to 20 percent and Peru un-
der increasing attack from corrupt functionaries, guerrillas, terrorists, and
narcos—is Toledo beginning to descry the awful dangers.
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Traveling through Argentina and Peru, I saw some of these dangers, which, if
not met, will press upon the United States like rising water. There are, first of all,
the social and economic problems, which have been exacerbated by a political
class that, Menem or Montesinos-like, has consistently stolen crippling fractions
of national income. Cynicism and apathy sap these countries like a disease.
When I asked a Peruvian cab driver (a schoolteacher playing hooky) what it
means to be “Peruvian,” he stammered incomprehensibly for at least a minute
before settling into a short lecture about Peru’s 1995 border war with Ecuador
and its “spontaneous surge of volunteers for the national cause.” One of those
volunteers was “a sixteen-year-old boy, who insisted on going to the front, where
he was killed. We have named streets and plazas for him! He is a great Peruvian
hero!”
“What was his name?” I asked.
“I can’t remember.”
“But are there any typical ‘Peruvian’ virtues or characteristics,” I asked. “What
makes a Peruvian different from, say, a Colombian?” No answer. I was reminded
of the globe-trotting John Gunther’s line about Peru: “The country seems to
lack vitality. A reporter feels almost like an archaeologist.” There is indeed a cer-
tain pointlessness to national life in many Latin American countries, where
more and more people have a sense of not belonging to their political cultures,
of living (just barely) in systems that do not function well and that lack true rep-
resentation. Voting is a charade; taxes are to be avoided; “public service” is a li-
cense to steal. Reading the hateful graffiti and watching the cacerolazas in
Argentina, I thought of a passage in V. S. Naipaul’s The Return of Eva Perón, my
favorite exploration of the Argentine soul:
Argentina is still . . . like a sixteenth-century colony of the Spanish Empire, with the
same greed and internal weaknesses, the same potential for dissension, the cynicism
and sterility. Obedezco pero no cumplo, I obey but I don’t comply: it was the attitude
of the sixteenth-century conquistador or official, who had a contract with the King of
Spain alone, and not with the King’s other subjects. In Argentina, the contract is not
with other Argentines, but with the rich land.
The problem, of course, for Argentina is that the “rich land” has been tapped,
and its production cheapened and marginalized by increased agricultural yields
around the world and by American, Australian, and Brazilian herds that now
dwarf those of the pampas. The days when the vast silos and frigoríficos of
Rosario, Buenos Aires, and Bahia Blanca fed the world (and plunked a daily tin
of corned beef into the knapsacks of ten million European infantrymen) are
long gone, and more Argentines are now fighting over a smaller pie. A country
that once united against British exploitation (“hay que ser inglés para ser hijo de
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puta”—you have to be English to be a son of a bitch) and vied with the United
States for control of Latin America today exhibits little sense of national unity or
purpose (beyond Argentina’s quadrennial appearances in World Cup soccer
matches). Argentines are thus easily isolated and pickpocketed by their politi-
cians, who merely perfect the arts of scamming and tax dodging already prac-
ticed by many citizens. “We get the governments we deserve,” a Buenos Aires
travel agent glumly told me one afternoon.
A favorite comic book in Argentina is Las Locuras de Isidoro Cañones (“The
Madness of Isidoro Cañones”), which speaks volumes about the nation. Isidoro
is the twenty-something nephew of a rich porteño, an Argentine Richie Rich.
But, as all Americans of a certain age know, Richie Rich was always doing good
deeds; Isidoro just as resolutely cheats. Thus, in the latest issue of Las Locuras,
Cañones senior flies to Paris (first-class, of course), and junior promptly loots
the bank account, exhausts “Tio’s” credit at the local supermarket (buying
French champagne, Beluga caviar, and foie gras, which he then marks up and re-
sells), then rushes off to the summer playground of Punta del Este, where he ille-
gally sublets uncle’s beach house for cash. The total proceeds of these
transactions are swiftly dissipated on women and gambling. On the last page, a
broke and only slightly demoralized Isidoro looks ahead to his next caper.
The usual South American
solution to the deadlock that
gripped Peru in the 1980s and
has now emerged in Argentina is
the military coup, or golpe, but
that option too is off the table,
Argentina’s last military regime
having disgraced itself even before the Falklands fiasco. The departed
Fujimori/Montesinos regime furnished further proof, if it were needed, that
“Bonapartist solutions”—interventions by enlightened strongmen buttressed
by big business and the military—rarely succeed. On the contrary, deprived of
constitutional checks and balances, they slide into corruption and tyranny, how-
ever well intentioned at the outset. This leaves the road less traveled—real de-
mocracy—which will take root only when education spreads and citizens insist
on good government. That will take generations in South America, but the pro-
cess has begun here and there. My Argentine mother-in-law, for example, leads a
new citizens group in Bariloche called Consciencia (Consciousness), which
aims to instruct Argentine citizens about their political system and constitu-
tional rights and responsibilities.
If not improved and enriched by remedies discussed below, Latin America
will pose one of North America’s greatest security threats. Its “lawless areas”—in
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ble exit. The only way forward, they told me, is
to tear down the life-sucking political/bureau-
cratic superstructure and replace it with some-
thing better.
24
Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 3, Art. 4
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss3/4
Central America, Suriname, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Paraguay—are
spreading like cancer, providing terrorists and criminals with proximity and ac-
cess to the United States. Signs of the cancer are already obvious, with Colom-
bia’s drug-running FARC installed until recently—by formal agreement with
the Andres Pastrana government—on a wedge of sovereign Colombian territory
the size of Switzerland. The cocaine produced in FARC’s despeje, or safe haven
(and the no less autonomous cantons of crooked generals and right-wing
paramilitaries), furnishes 80–90 percent of the cocaine consumed in the United
States and a growing quantity of heroin as well.
The problems of the region are frustratingly diffuse. Citizenship and pass-
ports are easy to procure in Latin America, disguising the movements of terror-
ists and narcos. Border towns like Ciudad del Este in Paraguay and Maicao in
Colombia crawl with terrorists and criminals, who use the relaxed customs and
immigration procedures to move men and equipment around the region.
al-Qa‘ida operatives have been arrested in Brazil and Ecuador, Irish Republican
Army explosives experts have been tracked to Colombia, and advanced Peruvian
weapons—including the man-portable Igla (the Russian Stinger)—are ru-
mored to have gone missing from government armories. The region, in short, is
ill, sickened by indifferent government and economic malaise, and the sad fact is
that most of the Latin American countries could become what Montesinos
called Peru two years ago—“transit points” and “rest areas” for international
criminals and terrorists. North America must engage energetically in the South,
the sooner the better.
Yet what, realistically, can be done in the face of so many seemingly intracta-
ble problems? There are a number of possible approaches. Foreign aid can be
aimed with greater precision, using some of the more effective United Nations
agencies and nongovernmental organizations on the spot in Latin America. The
UN’s World Food Program, for example, has proven effective at raising school
attendance in even the most impoverished areas by the simple expedient of of-
fering school lunches and take-home family rations. With this incentive, even
the most benighted parents have seen fit to send their children to school, which
in turn lowers birth rates, improves public health, and deepens the foundations
of civil society. Similarly, the UN’s Food and Agricultural Organization tripled
fish-farming production in Latin America in the 1990s, furnishing critical pro-
tein to millions. Nongovernmental organizations like CARE serve a similar
function, cajoling, teaching, and improving. Once effective strategies of foreign
aid are in place, the United States can begin to increase its annual contribution,
which today is far less (as a percentage of national wealth) than is provided by Ja-
pan, Canada, Australia, or Western Europe. Total foreign aid from rich countries
to poor has fallen 16 percent over the last decade, to just fifty billion dollars
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today, a drop in the vast barrel of multitrillion-dollar economies. U.S. foreign
aid is down to ten billion dollars, just 0.1 percent of gross domestic product, the
lowest level since World War II.
Of course, no American taxpayer will want to commit a penny of aid to cor-
rupt governments, which is why we must engage energetically in helping to
build solid, participatory democracies. There is need for candor here, and Latin
American political institutions must be subjected to hard scrutiny and criticism.
All of President Vicente Fox’s desired reforms in Mexico—to the tax structure,
the budget process, the economy—have been snagged or stopped cold by the
Mexican legislature, which, like the Argentine congress, is a featherbed of crony-
ism and special interests. We should have pressed the Argentines earlier to re-
form their politics (the rapacious governors, the crooked privatizations), and we
should not now turn a blind eye to poorly functioning democracies but push
hard for their reform, using diplomacy, publicity, credit, and foreign aid as le-
vers, in much the way that the IMF—which disastrously overestimated
Menem—is now belatedly pressing Argentina to change. Mismanagement and
crushing foreign debt burdens must be identified early and prevented to spare
countries themselves, but also foreign lenders now faced with complex
restructurings—and bankruptcies. Citizen groups must be encouraged to par-
ticipate. The U.S. Agency for International Development has done yeoman’s ser-
vice in this respect and can do more.
Indeed “do-gooding” has always coexisted with ruthless pragmatism in
Washington’s approach to Latin America—the United States spent a billion dol-
lars alleviating misery in Peru in the 1990s as a way of propping up
Fujimori—but it must begin to tip the equation away from realpolitik, even at
the cost of some short-term instability. President Clinton set a good example in
this regard, refusing his support to prospective military coups in Guatemala and
Venezuela in 1992–93, Paraguay in 1996, and Peru in 2000. Clinton declassified
many documents relating to U.S. “dirty tricks” in Latin America during the Cold
War and let it be known that Washington seeks a more transparent and even-
handed relationship with its American neighbors. This trend must be continued
to erase the residue of distrust “south of the border,” where governments assume
that America will sanction coups—like the failed ouster of Venezuela’s Hugo
Chávez in April 2002—and wink at tyranny and human rights abuses whenever
“stability” is on the line.
The evaporation of U.S. and other foreign aid leaves free trade as the only
“fencepost” against which Latin American countries can lean. If given preferen-
tial access to the American market like Mexico, they can export themselves out
of trouble and appease domestic constituencies bankrupted by U.S. antidrug
programs. Unfortunately, Washington has lately sent the wrong signal, blocking
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entry to the American market while increasing demands for coca eradica-
tion—contradictory measures that have hit Latin Americans hard. Soon after
talking free trade and an expanded Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)
in Lima in March 2002, President Bush clapped tariffs on foreign steel and
plywood, infuriating Latin Americans. Protective tariffs, particularly in old-
economy industries and agriculture, stunt the very growth needed to make
Latin Americans healthier, richer customers for America’s new-economy
businesses.
Sloppiness in this regard is not without risk. Stumbling Latin American econ-
omies are easy prey for populists, who blame all the ills of their countries on free
market policies “imported” from the United States. If Brazil’s economy slips any
more, many Brazilians assume, Luis “Lula” Da Silva—chief of the Worker’s
Party—will win presidential elections in the fall, placing Latin America’s largest
country under a leftist regime that is far from pro-American.
There is also a geostrategic risk. In the absence of a real FTAA—promised
by Clinton for 2005 but nowhere in sight, because of congressional foot-
dragging—Brazil, the world’s eighth-largest economy, has the opportunity to
establish an enlarged Mercosur, which would channel profits and influence
through Brasilia rather than Florida, Texas, or California. Farther afield, the Eu-
ropean Union is firmly opposed to an American-led FTAA; Spain’s prime minis-
ter, José María Aznar, declared in November 2001 (in language that must have
made James Monroe roll in his grave) that Brussels sees “the development of its
relationship with Ibero-America as a strategic component” of future EU policy.
The current reality—that European markets are closed to many Latin American
exports and that Brazil lacks the economic muscle to organize the region—must
not make America complacent. Resented as we are by Latin American thinkers
for our blinkered obsession with Cuba, immigration, and drugs, we are not the
only game in town, and must begin playing hard for the loyalty of our southern
trading partners.
Organizations like the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the
International Monetary Fund must use their expertise to introduce developing
countries to the complex world of international trade and investment. Latin
America has the same raw potential for rapid growth as Asia. It has a banking
system and a young, disciplined workforce capable of low-cost, high-quality
production. We must reinforce these characteristics with rising flows of
trade and investment. Even while fostering Latin American growth, we must
undermine increasingly strident antiglobalization groups, which, since the
1999 “Battle of Seattle” protesting that year’s WTO conference, have tried to
block the shift of American and European industries to the low-wage South.
The antiglobalization cause is generally counterproductive. Its fight against
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“runaway industry” benefits the rich countries at the expense of the poor; in this
sense, critics are correct in accusing the antiglobalizers of attacking wealth
rather than the more appropriate target, poverty. Additionally, the
antiglobalizers’ efforts to protect the environment by slowing industrialization
in the third world are often wrongheaded. Globalization does not always plun-
der the environment; sometimes foreign manufacturers rescue regions blighted
by local producers. Take the Brazilian chemical city of Cubatão—once the
world’s dirtiest place. It was ruined by Brazilian manufacturers, then cleaned
up to international standards by U.S., Japanese, and European multinationals.
In the end, the antiglobalization movement panders to the worst instincts of
the Latin American countries, specifically their tendency—imported from
nineteenth-century Europe—to centralize and control, which only worsens
their already lamentable plight in a fast-moving, globalized world.
One form of trade deplored by most of the Latin Americans I spoke with is
arms sales. The continent is remarkably peaceful; Chile’s purchases of advanced
land, air, and naval systems needlessly raise the stakes in the region. What Chile
acquired are power-projection capabilities, which its neighbors lack and may
feel compelled to acquire, at enormous, draining expense. If power projection
(justified by Santiago on the grounds that Chile extends 2,600 miles from end to
end and that Easter Island lies 2,300 miles offshore) seems a luxury that rich
Chile can afford, a closer look reveals that even Chile might have better uses for
the billions spent on tanks, aircraft, frigates, and submarines. Unemployment
remains stubbornly high, and Chileans face a generally low standard of living
and a typically third-world concentration of wealth at the top. Money also needs
to be spent to bring air, water, and industrial pollution under control and to
clear the slums around the cities. When I asked the Argentines how the Chilean
armed forces were able to pry so much procurement money out of the Ricardo
Lagos government, they replied that the Chilean military “enjoys a divine posi-
tion thanks to Pinochet,” who insisted on their “independence” from civilian
management. In all of South America, only the Chilean military is guaranteed an
annual percentage of export revenue for procurement, an arrangement redolent
of Bismarck’s nineteenth-century “iron budgets,” which forced successive Ger-
man parliaments to concede much more money to defense than they would have
liked. Thus, Chile’s military spending of 4 percent of GDP is nearly double the
rate of Brazil and Argentina—for no apparent reason. Although Chile clearly
has uses for its new platforms, their cost (in the absence of real threats) detracts
from domestic development and provokes a region where militaries are shrink-
ing. (Brazil will probably shell out $909 million in June 2002 for twenty-eight
F-16 C/Ds, a direct consequence of the Chilean buy.) As the leading seller of ar-
maments to the developing world, the United States can steer friends like Chile
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and Brazil toward more prudent expenditures (and heed Peruvian president
Alejandro Toledo’s reminder that “nutrition, health, and education are the best
investments that we can make”) without unduly damaging American business
interests.
For many Latin Americans, the U.S.-led $1.3 billion “Plan Colombia” encap-
sulates all that is wrong and misguided in the Yanqui approach to the South. In
the first place, from the Colombian perspective, it is really a $7.5 billion plan,
most of which will be remitted by the Colombian taxpayer. Scarcely any of
Washington’s contribution will be spent on refugees or the peace process but
rather on American-made hardware (the best kind of “foreign aid,” from Con-
gress’s pinched perspective): $635 million to Dyncorp, $234 million to Sikorsky
Aircraft, seventy-six million to Bell Helicopter, sixty-eight million to Lockheed
Martin, thirty million to Northrop Grumman, and so on. To Colombians, this
bone-crunching American intervention has an air of futility about it in any case,
for the “war on drugs” has seen a 140 percent expansion of Latin American coca
plantations since 1995, which, after all, merely supply burgeoning demand in the
United States. Why, Latin Americans rightly ask, does the United States hammer
away, Vietnam-style, at South America’s 123,000 hectares of coca when the
problem so obviously originates in North American families, streets, and
schools? Seven million Americans will use crack or speedball this year (more
than two hundred thousand will end up in emergency rooms), and American
demand for heroin and “club drugs” is rising 15 percent every year.
We will spend sixty billion dollars—more than three times the combined de-
fense budgets of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru—on drug educa-
tion, prevention, and rehabilitation programs this year, and millions more
policing drug-related crimes, yet somehow we persuade ourselves that the crux
of the problem is there, not here. Latin Americans goggle in disbelief. Mighty
challenges like these lie ahead and all around us, and Americans—who are la-
beled “conquistadors with cell-phones” by their gentler critics in the region—
must rise to meet them.
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